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Abstract 
Over  the past decade,  several  researchers have  suggested  that 
mu1  ti  bank  holding company  organizational  structure will  systematically 
infl  uence  the performance  of  subsidiary banks.  Specifical ly, these 
researchers  have  hypothesized that the magnitude  of  affiliation 
benefits generated  by  a particular holding company  will  be  positively 
related to the degree  to which  control  over  subsidiary  bank  decisions 
and  operations is centralized  in  the hands  of  the parent corporation. 
To  date,  this possibility has  been  ignored  in the empirical  studies 
exploring  holding company  affiliation impacts,  perhaps  biasing  their 
results.  To  obtain  insight on  this issue,  quantitative measures  of 
the organizational  centralization of  62  multibank  holding companies, 
derived  from  survey  data, were  related to summary  measures  of 
holding  company  profitability.  A  positive,  significant relation- 
ship was  discovered  between  these centralization indexes and  holding 
company  profitability. 
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Multibank  holding  company  (MBHC)  growth  has  been  rapid since 
the 1970  amendments  to the Bank  Holding  Company  Act  of  1956.  Recent 
actual  and  proposed  legislative changes  suggest that this growth 
will  continue  in  the future.  Accordingly,  economists,  bankers, 
regulators, and  legislators have  been  and  continue  to be  concerned 
with  the impact  of  holding company  growth  on  subsidiary banks,  un- 
aff  i  1  iated bank  competitors ,and  the convenience  and  needs  of  the 
publ ic. 
Mu1  tibank  holding  company  affil  iation generally  has  been  ex- 
pected  to alter subsidiary bank  behavior  relative to independent 
banks  producing  mu1 tiple impacts  (see Drum  1976  and  Board  of 
Governors  1978).  Numerous  researchers  have  suggested  that the affili- 
ation of  an  independent  bank  with  a larger holding  company 
organization should  a1 low  the subsidiary to real ize various types 
of  economies  (technical and/or  pecuniary economies  and/or  economies 
of  organization) and  so  improve  its efficiency relative to com- 
parable  nonaffil iate banks.  Reduced  costs may  result in  lower 
prices and/or  higher  deposit  rates benefiting consumers.  Access 
to the greater resources and  expertise of  the holding company  may 
permit  subsidiaries  to offer a greater array of  services than 
possi bl e for independents,  another  publ ic benefit.  Further, 
since a holding  company's  sources and  uses  of  funds  are typically 
more  diversified  than  those of  independent  banks,  and  because 
MBHCs  can  raise capital  more  easily and  cheaply,  an  affiliate's 
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be  able to  reduce  liquid asset holdings  safely, increase earning 
assets,and decrease capital  relative to total  assets.  Again,  the 
public may  benefit if more  credit flows  into the local  area.  However, 
since  holding  company  external  expansion  results in  increased con- 
centration and  mu1 ti  -market  1  inkages  and,  possi bi ly, a decl ine in 
competition,  the performance  changes  described  above  may  result in 
private  rather than  social  benefits. 
Accordingly,  many  empirical  investigations of  the impact  of 
MBHC  affiliation on  bank  performance  have  been  undertaken  over  the 
past decade. '  In  general,  a1 though  numerous  hypothetical  per- 
formance  benefits have  been  identified,  very  few  modest 
affil  iation impacts  have  been  discovered.  Typically , affiliate asset 
structures have  been  found  to reflect less 1 iquidity and  more  risk, 
as expected.  However,  while affil  iation appears  to enhance  revenues,  sub- 
si  diary costs  generally  are higher  than  those of  independents;  thus, sub- 
si  diary  profi tabil i  ty is not significantly different from  independent  banks 
However,  there is evidence suggesting that the methodological 
approach  employed  in  the bulk of  these studies has  been  responsible 
for the failure of  researchers  to discover appreciable affiliation- 
related  performance  impacts.  Typically,  researchers  have  assumed 
that holding company  affiliation --  per  se will  a1 ter subsidiary bank 
performance  relative to independent  banks.  That  is, in  most 
empirical  studies a1 1 holding companies  and  holding  company  affil  iate 
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Several  researchers have  suggested that this approach  is  incorrect 
and biases the results of  these performance  studiese3  These 
writers maintain that the operational  policies or organizational 
structure of  the particular mu1 tibank holding company  influences 
the extent to  which hypothetical  affiliation impacts are actually 
manifest (see Lawrence 1977  and Weiss  1969).  More  specifically, 
these researchers hypothesize that the affiliation impact of  any 
MBHC  on  its  bank  subsidiaries is  contingent on  the extent to 
which subsidiary bank  decisions,  pol  icies,and  operations are 
centralized in  the hands  of the parent corporation or lead bank. 
The  contention that a linkage exists between  MBHC  structure and 
performance  is  important because several  studies of  MBHC  operational 
pol  icies have revealed that structural  central  ization varies widely 
among  compani e~.~  Further,  several researchers have  provided a 
limited amount  of  empirical evidence  suggesting that affiliation 
impacts differ  significantly across MBHCs,  implying that MBHC 
structure and performance might be  related (see Fraas 1974,  Hoffman 
1976,  and Mayne  1976).  One  writer concludes  that offsetting per- 
formance  variations attributable to structural  differences are 
largely responsible for blurring the impact of  MBHC  affiliation 
on bank  performance  (see  Fraas 1974,  p.  18). 
In addition,  researchers  have  suggested  that MBHCs  may  attempt 
to maximize  corporate rather than subsidiary bank  level performance. 
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totally or partially,affiliation benefits realized  by  bank 
subsidiaries through  the use  of  intra-company  revenue  transfers 
(i  .e.,  management  fees).  If  this is the case,  beneficial  affiliation 
impacts,  particularly lower  costs resul ting from  scale economies, 
may  not  be  detectable at the subsidiary  bank  level .  5 
Several  implications  follow from  these arguments.  First, 
in  subsidiary performance  studies,  it  may  be  necessary  to 
control  expl ici  tly for differences  in hol ding company  central iza- 
tion.  Second,  if MBHCs  do  attempt  to maximize  corporate profita- 
bility, it  may  only  be  possible to obtain  indirect empirical 
evidence on  the subsidiary level  efficiency  impacts  of  affi  1 iation 
by  analyzing  the consolidated  performance  of  MBHCs. 
This  study represents an  attempt to determine empirically 
whether differences in  MBHC  organizational  centralization are 
systematical ly re1 ated  to differences in  consol idated  holding 
company  performance.  The  sample  is cross-sectional, consisting 
of  62  MBHCs  located  in 12  states whose  management  responded  to 
a survey of  their operational  policies  in November  1979.  6 
The  design  of  the study reflects several  underlying assumptions. 
The  primary  goal  of  MBHC  senior management  is assumed  to be  the 
maximization  of  corporate long-run  profits.  Organizational 
structure is assumed  to be  adjusted  to facilitate goal  attainment. 
Thus,  corporate organizational  structure is expected  to be  related 
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determined  primari ly by  aggrega.te subsidiary bank  performance. 7 
Thus,  it  is assumed  that MBHC  organizational  structure with  respect 
to  bank  subsidiaries will  significantly impact  bank  affiliate 
performance  and,  through  this channel , corporate  performance.  MBHC 
operat,ional policies with  respect  to non-bank  affiliates 
are ignored.  Since the performance  impact  of  the centralization 
of  any  single decision  or operation  is likely to be  complex,  and 
contingent on  the extent to which  other decisions and  operations 
are centralized,  summary  measures of  MBHC  centralization are 
related to summary  measures  of  MBHC  performance. 
11.  Theoretical  Issues 
Past  research  on  MBHC  operational  policies has  been  motivated 
by  the belief  that centralization  of  certain decisions and 
operations in  holding companies  would  enhance  subsidiary revenues 
and/or  reduce costs either directly or indirectly (see Lawrence 
1971,for example).  Centralization may  allow expensive  indivisible 
capital  inputs to be  fully utilized.  For  example,  average compu- 
ion  costs tend  to fall as the size and  power  of  the computer 
rises.  Thus,  central ization of  data  processing ensures 
ge computer  system  will  be  optimally  utilized and  so 
some  economies  to be  real ized  by  the holding company. 
of  functions  such  as asset and/or  1  iabil  ity manage- 
enerate economies  by  a1 1 owing  special ization and 
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of  parent company  staff experts if operations such  as securities 
portfolio management  are centralized rather than  decentralized. 
Subsidiary capital  and  materials costs may  be  reduced  if the larger, 
more  diversified holding company  raises the bulk  of  external  funds 
required by  subsidiaries and  centralizes purchasing.  Further, 
centralization in the b~dgetary~accounting  and  auditing areas,  in 
conjunction with  the operation of  a central ized  incentive system, 
provides the parent company  with the capabilities to monitor, 
eval uate, and  st  imul ate the performance  of  subsidiary personnel . 
Suboptimization  with  respect to corporate goals can  be  detected 
and  prevented.  Conversely,  in decentralized  MBHCsy  subsidiary 
banks  essentially operate autonomously,and  so  there is no  reason 
to expect  their performance  to differ appreciably  from  comparable 
independent  banks. 
General ly,  previous  researchers in  this area  have  assumed  that 
the net performance  benefits generated  by  any  MBHC  will  be 
positively,  monotonical ly (though not necessarily 1  inearly)  re1  ated 
to the degree of  parent-company  organizational  central ization.  This 
view  reflects the imp1 ici  t assumption  that gross structural  benefits 
exceed  structural ly re1  ated "coordination costs" as organizational 
central ization is increased.8  However,  Lawrence  and  others exploring 
the question of  structural  variation among  MBHCs  have  emphasized 
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alternative, and  so observed  structure ifzelf, may  vary  with  certain 
f  i  rm-specifi c characteristics and/or  the nature of  the  particul ar 
holding  company's  operating environment  (see Lawrence 1971 ) .  For 
example,  some  researchers  have  suggested  that structurally related 
"coordination  costs" may  rise relative to gross structural  benefits 
as corporate complexity  (proxied by  corporate size) increases, 
ceteri  s paribus  (see Longbrake  1974,  pp.  2-7).  Researchers  examining 
the relationship between  the structure and  performance  of  non- 
financial  firms  have  even  intimated  that structure and  performance 
might  be  simultaneous  (see Armour  and  Teece  1978,  pp.  11 2-1 13). 
Since  it  should  take  time  for management  to perceive  the need  for 
and  to implement  any  structural  change  and  then  for that change  to 
have  an  effect on  firm  performance,  structure is viewed  as an 
exogenous  variable in  the following analysis.  But since it  is 
assumed  that structure is not adjusted  rapidly in  response  to changes 
in  the characteristics or performance  of  the corporation,  and 
since structural  net  benefits may  vary with  firm characteristics 
such  as  size, a size-structure interaction  va-riabl e is included 
in some  of  the estimated  equations.  The  coefficient of  this 
variable should  be  negative. 
Successful  empirical  isolation of  the re1 ationship between 
MBHC  organizational  centralization and  performance  is possible only 
under  certain conditions.  Structural ly re1 ated performance  dif- 
ferentials can  be  detected only  if the sample  firms  can  sustain 
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should be  the case  of MBHCs  whose  bank  subsidiaries operate in 
an  environment  in  which competitive  forces are somewhat  constrained 
by regulation.  The  period of observation  is  also important.  The 
beneficial  impacts  of centralization on  performance may  be  obscured 
in  periods in  which the sample companies  are actively centralizing 
operations  and  functions.  Structural centralization is  often 
costly,  generating net benefits in  the long run.  In  the short run, 
the performance  impact  of  centralization (when  performance is 
measured  in  terms  of accounting rates of return) may  be  adverse. 
Centralization generally requires an  outlay of  money  and manpower 
in  the present,  while gross and  net structural  benefits  accrue 
with some  lag (see  Association of  Bank  Holding Companies  1978, 
pp.  28-29).  Thus,  the re1  ationship between  corporate structure 
and  performance  may  be  empirically detectable only in  a period of 
relative structural equilibrium.  Evidence  provided in  a recent 
survey of the Association of  Bank  Holding Companies  (1978)  suggests 
that the present is  such  a time period. 
111.  The  Model 
Several  variants of  the following simple model  of  firm  perfor- 
mance  are ultimately estimated be1  ow: 
(1)  P.  =  P.  (C-,  FCy E), 
-1  -1  -1  - 
where 
P.  =  alternative measures  of MBHC  consolidated profitability, 
-1 
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FC  =  a vector of  firm-characteristic variables affecting  - 
profitabil ity, 
OE  =  a vector of  operating-environment  variables impacting  - 
profi  tabil  ity. 
Dependent  Variables 
Variants of  two  basic types of  dependent  profitability measures 
were employed:  the valuation ratio (El, 3,  Pj)  and  the rate of 
return  on  average  equity  (E4)  .'  It is felt that the valuation 
ratio measures  better reflect structural  impacts  on  performance, 
although  both  measures  are highly correlated.  The  correlation 
between -  P1  and -  P4  is 0.69,  for example. 
The  valuation  ratio can  be  viewed  as an  expected  rate of 
return.''  The  numerator  of  this measure  (the market  value of  a 
share of  corporate equity)  is a proxy  for expected  corporate net 
income.  This future net income  estimate  is determined  in  the 
securities markets  by  the interaction of  a  broad  group of  market 
participants.  The  higher  the consensus  estimate of  a corporation's 
future net  income  stream,  ceteris paribus,  the higher  the  price that 
investors are willing to pay  for a claim  to this stream.  While 
this net  income  proxy  provides  no  insight as  to the expected 
time distribution of  this stream,  it is reasonable to assume  that 
it reflects investor expectations of  corporate net  income  in  the 
near  future (the period  over which  the impacts  of  the structure in 
place  should  be  real ized)  . 
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measure  of  the capital  required to duplicate  the firm produces 
an  expected  rate of  return.  Pel tzman  and  others have  suggested 
that the book  value  of a share of corporate equity is a  reasonably 
good  proxy  for rep1  acement  val ue , particul  arly for depository 
institutions (see Pel tzman  1965  and  Wall ich  1980). 
It is true that book-value  capital  measures  are distorted by 
changes  in  market  interest rates over  time.  Rate  changes  cause  the 
market  val ue  of  fi  xed-rate earning assets he1 d  by  depository 
institutions to diverge  from  their reported  book  value.  Researchers 
disagree on  the need  for and  difficulties inmlved in ,adjusting 
book-val ue  capital  measures  for changes  in interest rates. 11 
MBHCs  report sufficient data  to allow at least one  such  adjustment 
to be  made.  Both  the book  value and  market  value  of  investment 
securities appear  in published  financial  statements.  Accordingly, 
the book-value of  MBHC  equity was  adjusted to reflect this dif- 
ferenti  a1 , and  the adjusted book-val ue  measure was  used  to 
construct an  adjusted valuation  ratio  (E3). 
Since  the  va1 uation  ratio is an  expected  rate of  return, 
this performance  measure  may  best  reflect the ultimate impact  of 
current organizational  structure on  performance.  As  a1 ready 
noted,  the short-run  impact  of  centralization on  accounting- 
statement performance  may  be  adverse,  with net benefits occurring 
with some  lag.  The  valuation ratio may  capture the  incompletely 
real i zed 1  onger-run  benefi ci a1  impact  of structure on  performance. 
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val uation  ratios,  a1 so was  empl qyed  as  a dependent  profi tabil i ty 
measure  (5).  Armour  and  Teece  (1978) have  justified the appro- 
priateness of  using this type of  accounting  rate-of-return 
measure  to ref1  ect structural  impacts on  corporate performance. 
The  exact definition of  the performance  and  other variables used 
and  their mean  and standard  deviations appear  in Appendix 1. 
Independent Variables 
Structural  Indexes.  Quantitative non-dummy  central ization 
indexes were  constructed  for the 62  sample  companies  from  the 
November  1979  survey  data.  Following  the basic methodology  of 
Lawrence  (1971  ) , the survey questions were  designed  to elicit the 
degree  of  parent company  invol vment  in and  control  over  sub- 
sidiary bank  decisions,  or equivalently,  MBHC organizational 
central ization  in  11  different operational  areas .'  Questions 
were  asked  about holding company  involvement  in subsidiary bank 
management,  budget  pol i  ci  es , capital management,  correspondent 
re1 ationships, loan  participations, federal -funds  transactions, 
management  of securities portfol ios , loan  portfol ios , and 
1  i abi 1  i ti  es,  pricing,  and  miscellaneous areas,  such  as  purchasing, 
data  processing,  incentive  systems,  trust accounting,  and  auditing. 
Several  questions were  asked  about holding company  pol i cies in 
each  of  these areas.  The  number  of  questions asked  varied over 
the policy areas.  The  greater the estimated  performance  impact  of 
central ization of decisions  in an  area,  the greater the number  of 
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were asked  concerning  MBHC  involvement  in  the management  of  sub- 
si  di  ary capi tal , securities  portfol ios , and  loan  portfol ios  . 
Fewer  questions were  asked  about  the parent company's  role in 
subsi diary correspondent  re1 ationshi ps.  In  general , each  company 
received one  "centralization  point" in  a  particular area for each 
response suggesting parent-company  invol vement  in subsi di ary-bank 
decisions  in that area.  Thus,  the  greater the  revealed  degree of 
holding  company  involvement  in any  area,  the higher  the central ization 
score assigned.  Using  this procedure,  structural scores were 
generated  for each  respondent  in each  of  the 11  policy areas.  Since 
more  questions were  asked,  more  centralization points  potentially 
could  be  gained  in the key  policy areas. 
These  pol icy area scores were  aggregated  in several  ways  to 
form  summary  centralization indexes.  Measures  CTP  and  CT  were 
formed  by simply  summing  the first 10 and  all  11  pol icy-area 
central i zation scores,  respectively.  This  procedure  imp1 i ci  tly 
weighted centralization in  the critical operational  areas more 
heavily.  Equally weighted  counterparts  to these central ization 
measures  (CTPE  and  CTE)  also were  constructed.  These  two 
indexes were  formed  by  summing  the first 10  and  all 11  deflated 
policy-area  scores,  respectively.  The  policy-area  scores were 
deflated by  the potential  maximum  central ization score obtainable 
in that area,  so that all were  constrained  to vary  between  zero 
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by  applying  the technique of  principal -components  analysis  to the 
first 10  and  then  all 11  policy-area scores.  Both  measures  are 
simply  the factor scores aenerated  by  the coefficients of  the 
first principal  component  obtained  in the factor analysis.  For  all 
of  these indexes,  the higher the index,  the higher  the estimated 
degree of  MBHC  organizational  central ization.  The  correlation 
between  any  two  of these measures  was  0.88  or greater. 
While  the procedures  used  to derive these indexes are 
admittedly subjective,  the summary  structural  measures  shoul d 
adequately  ref1  ect differences in  the relative degree of 
organizational  central i za  ti  on  between  sampl e companies . 
Examination  of  the standard deviation of  these measures  and  the 
standard deviation relative to the mean  reveals considerable 
structural  variation between  companies  (see appendix 1  ) .  This 
finding is consistent with the descriptive survey  evi dence 
concerning  MBHC  organizational  structure pub1 i  shed  over the 
past decade.  Quantitative structural  indexes are considered 
superior to simple  dummy  structural  classifications when 
empirically examining  the impact of  holding company  structure 
on  performance.  Dummy  structural  classifications necessitate 
more  subjective,  dichotomous  judgments  on  the part of  the  re- 
searcher and  by  nature are more  crude  and  imprecise. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyFirm-Characteristi c Variables.  It is recognized  that other non- 
structural, firm-specific characteristics may  affect MBHC  performance. 
Since  individual  MBHCs  vary  greatly with  respect to these character- 
istics, additional  expl anatory  variables were  incl uded  in various 
specifications of equation 1 to control  for these factors.  Because 
this study  focuses  on  the re1 ationship between  MBHC  organizational 
structure and  performance,  the discussion  of  the expanded  i  nfl uence 
of  the fi  rm-characteri sti  c variables on  MBHC  performance wi  11  be 
rather cursory. 
Holding  company  size (SIZE), measured  in terms  of  consolidated 
total  deposits,  is incl uded  as an  explanatory  variable to control 
for the presence of  economies  of  scale.  Incl usion  of a size 
variable reflects the traditional  mi  croeconomi c assumption  that 
minimum  costs  vary  with size.  However,  the hypothesis  that 
organizational  structure affects performance  imp1 i  es that minimum 
costs may  not  be  attained.  Firms  are presumed  to operate at 
minimum  costs only  if organizational  structure is chosen  optimally. 
If organizational  form  is non-optimal,  costs will  be  above  minimum 
levels.  Thus,  size,  in addition  to structure, should  affect costs 
and  profitability and  so merits inclusion  as an  independent  variable. 
Since size may  generate economies  or diseconomies,  the size coef- 
ficient sign is ambiguous -  a priori  . 
As  already  noted,  several  researchers  have  suggested  that 
the net performance  benefits  generated by  a particular type of 
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Accordingly,  a size-structure interaction.  term  (CTPSIZE)  is in- 
cl uded  in some  of  the forms  of  equation 1 estimated  below. 
Structurally related "coordination  costs" are expected  to rise, 
and  structural  net benefits to fall, as size increases,  ceteris 
paribus.  The  implication  is that the interaction  term coefficient 
s  houl d  be  negati ve; 
A  holding  company's  profi tabil ity may  be  affected by  its 
risk posture as well  as  its organizational  structhre.  Firms  may 
realize higher profitability by  taking on  greater risk.  A 
financial  leverage  variable  (LEVC)  is used  as a risk proxy  in the 
val uation-ratio-dependent equations.  The  coefficient of variation 
of return on  equity (CVROE)  is the risk proxy  in the return on 
equity equations.  A  positive relationship is expected between 
these risk proxies and  MBHC  profitability. 
Several  asset/l iabi 1  i ty  composition  measures  were  employed 
as control  variables  in the estimated equations  in which  the 
return on  equity measure  (P4) was  used  as the dependent  variable.  13 
- 
The  ratios of  tax-exempt  securities to total  assets  (TESR),  loans- 
to-deposits  (LDRAT),  and  short-term debt  to total  deposits  (STDR) 
were  used  as  explanatory  variables.  The  expected signs of  these 
variables  are positive,  positive, and  negative, respectively. 
The  ratio of  total  1  abor-re1  ated expenses  (salaries and 
fringes) to total operating revenue  (LABORCR)  was  a1 so  used  as 
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Best available copyan  explanatory  variable in  the estimated equations.  The  ratio 
was  included  to control  for differences in labor costs among  firms. 
It is expected  that this variable will  be  negatively  related to 
profitability. 
Growth  in  total  deposits  (GRTD)  also was  used  as a control 
variable.  Deposit  growth  was  measured  over  the 1977-78  period  to 
avoid  interactions between  profi tabil  i  ty and  growth.  A  priori , 
one  would  expect  growth  to raise average  costs and  depress 
profitability as capacity is strained.  In  a recent empirical 
study,  however,  Murray  and  White  (1980) found  deposit  growth  and 
unit costs  to be  negatively  related.  This finding can  be 
rational ized  in several  ways.  Rapidly  growing  firms may  possess 
newer,  more  productive  capital .  Another  possibility is that 
~rowth  may  proxy  demand  conditions not captured  by  other variables 
included in the model.  Alternatively, growth  may  proxy  manage- 
ment  quality.  Given  the weight of  existing empirical  evidence, 
growth  and  profitability are expected  to be  positively related. 
Operating-Envi ronment  Variables.  Since  MBHC  subsi diary-bank operations 
are constrained  to a sing1  e state, state-specific environmental  factors 
may  systematically affect MBHC  performance.  It is widely  accepted  that 
the extent to which  banking  resources are concentrated in the hands 
of  re1 atively few  organizations s houl d  impact  the performance  of 
depository  institutions.  Concentration and  the 1  i  kel ihood  of 
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Best available copycol 1  usi ve  behavior are expected to be  posi ti  vely  re1  ated.  Thus, 
statewide  concentration represented by  the fi  ve-fi rm  concentration 
ratio (CR5)  and  hol ding-company  profi tabil i  ty are expected  to be 
positively re1 ated.  14 
Bank  branching  regulation should  affect the intensity of 
both  actual  and  potential  banking  competition  within each  state. 
Two  branching dummies  are employed  in the estimated equations 
to control  for differences in branching  regulations.  Unit banking 
states form  the reference  group.  The  two  branching dummies  (BRDUM1, 
BRDUMZ)  take on  values of one  if 1  imited area or statewide 
branching is permitted,  respectively.  The  intensity of competition 
and  branching  freedom  are assumed  to be  positively related. 
Accordingly,  the coefficients of  both  dummies  are expected  to be 
negative,  with  the statewide dummy  having a 1  arger coefficient. 
IV.  Estimation  !*lethods and  Resul ts 
Various  forms  of  equation 1 were  estimated using  the technique 
of multiple regression.  This  R-rocedure  is appropriate if the 
assumption  of  structural  exogenei ty is val id.  The  assumption 
homoscedastici ty was  tested and  coul d  not be  rejected.'  -The 
estimated  equations  are listed in table  1.  In  both  the unadjusted 
and  adjusted val uation-ratio-dependent  equations,  the coef- 
ficient of  the structural variable was  consistently found  to be 
positive and  significant,  regardless of  the variant of  the val uation 
ratio or structural  index employed  (see equations 1 through 6  and 
9  through  14).  The  coefficients on  the structural  term  also were 
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structure interaction term was  included in  the estimated equation 
(see equations  7  and 8).  In this specification,  the interaction 
tern exhibits the expected negative significant  coefficient. 
The  coefficient signs of  the other explanatory variables in 
the valuation ratio-dependent equations  generally are reasonable 
and  significant.  The  size coefficient  typically is  negative. 
However,  the coefficient becomes  positive and  significant when  a 
size-structure interaction term is  incl  uded as  an  explanatory 
variable.  This  finding suggests  that MBHC  size and  structure have 
a cornpl ex  impact on  performance.  The  leverage variable exhibits 
a negative,  significant coefficient that is  counter to a priori 
expectations.  This may  have  occurred because  consol i  dated short- 
term debt,  a high-cost source of  funds,  is  included in  the 
numerator of  this measure.  Thus,  this variable may  reflect 
1  iabil  ity composition rather than proxy risk.  The  1  abor-cost 
variable has  the expected negative,  significant  coefficient.  The 
positive coefficient on  the growth  variable is  in  1  ine with -  a 
priori expectations.  The  positive significant coefficient on  the 
concentration variable suggests  that statewide banking structure 
may  affect  MBHC  performance.  The  negative branching  dummy 
coefficients  also were  expected.  The  exp7anatory power  of  the 
-2  estimated equations,  as  indicated by the -  R  and -  F  statistics,  is 
considerable given that the analysis is  cross-sectional .  Several 
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the dependent  profi tabil i  ty variable a1 so are reported in  table 1. 
Since the results were  similar regardless of  the structural  index 
employed,  only  equations  in which  the measures  CTP,  FCTP,  and 
CTPE  were  used  appear  in  the  table. 
The  results  obtained when  return on  equity was  used  as  the 
dependent  variabl e are consistent with  the findings  discussed above, 
although  they are somewhat  weaker.  This was  not  unexpected.  The 
coefficient on  the structural  variable is again  positive and 
significant in  a1 1 estimated equations. 
The  size variable was  never found  to be  significant in  pre- 
liminary analysis and  so generally was  dropped  from  the final  form 
of  the return-on-equi ty equations estimated.  The  other non- 
structural  explanatory  variabl es exhibit reasonable,  typical ly 
significant coefficients.  The  coefficient of  the  risk  proxy  in 
these equations  is positive and  significant as expected.  Again, 
the overall  explanatory power  of  the estimated equations is 
adequate. 
V.  Summary  and  Conclusions 
The  empirical  evidence  presented  in  this study suggests  that 
MBHC  organizational  structure,  specifically internal  structural 
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Best available copycentral ization, affects consol idated hol ding  company  performance.  In 
particular,  MBHC  consol idated profi  tabil i  ty and  central ization are 
positively related.  Presumably  this 1  inkage exists because  MBHC 
central ization systematical ly enhances  the efficiency of  its 
affil  iate banks. 
Given  that  MBHC  structures  vary  consi derably , this analysis 
implies  that it  is inappromiate in empirical  analysis to treat 
all  holding companies  and  their subsidiaries as members  of a 
sin91  e, homogeneous  group.  Public  pol icy governing  future intra- 
and  inter-state and  possibly inter-industry expansion  by  MBHCs 
should  be  guided  by  empirical  evidence obtained  from  studies  in 
which  differences  in  MBHC  organizational  structure are explicitly 
taken  into account. 
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1.  An  extensive listing of  these studies appears  in Drum  (1976). 
2.  The  findings of several  such  studies are summarized  in Board  of  Governors 
of  the Federal  Reserve System  (1978),  pp.  74-83. 
3.  See,  in particular,  Lawrence  (1971),  Fraas  (1974), and  Graddy  (1979). 
4.  See Weiss  (1969), Lawrence  (1971), Jesser (1973), Stodden  (1975), and 
the Association of Bank  Holding  Companies  (1978). 
5.  See  the discussion  in Drum  (1976), p.  11,  and  Board  of Governors  (1978),  p.  130, 
6.  The  states and  number of  responding MBHCs  in each  are as follows: 
Alabama,  5; Colorado,  3;  Florida,  7;  Massachusetts,  2;  Michigan,  2; 
Missouri,  3;  New  Jersey,  6; Ohio,  4;  Tennessee,  3;  Texas,  10;  Virginia, 
8;  and  Wisconsin,  9. 
7.  See  Mayne  (1980)  for the justification for this assumption. 
8.  It is possible that central ization might  produce  negative net benefits 
if carried to extremes.  MBHC  executives responding  to the 1978 
Association  of  Bank  Holding  Company  survey of  their operational 
policies indicated they were  acutely aware  of this possibility (see 
pp.  24-25).  Accordingly,  these executives emphasized  that central  iza- 
tion was  simply not undertaken  unl ess anticipated performance  benefits 
were  expected  greatly to ~xceed  any  structural 1  y re1  ated costs  .  Thus, 
nonmonotonic  forms  of the centralization-performance relationship 
might  not be  observed. 
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Best available copy9.  Generally,  the valuation ratio is  the market  value of a share  of 
equity divided by book  value of  equity per share. 
10.  This  view is developed by Pel tzman  (1965),  pp.  34-40,  and Ornstein 
(1973),  p.  90. 
11.  For example,  FlcConnell  (1980)  notes  that it  is  inappropriate to take 
into account rate impacts only on  fixed-rate  assets.  The  liabil  i  ty 
side of the balance  sheet  should be adjusted as  well.  Insufficient 
data do  not permit this to be  done.  McConnell  also suggests  that 
adjustment is  unnecessary,  since the imbalance  between fi  xed-rate 
assets and  1  iabil  ities is  typically slight.  Further, if  any  imbalance 
exists,  the book  value of  equity ultimately is  affected  by,  and 
reflects the impact of,  market-rate changes  through changes  in  net 
interest income,  net income,  and  retained earnings. 
12.  The  survey questions and responses  are summarized  in  Whalen  (1981-82). 
13.  These  variables were  never significant in  the val  uation ratio-dependent 
equations and  so  were  not included in  the final  form  of these equations 
estimated. 
14.  For a discussion of  the possible linkages between  statewide banking 
structure and performance,  see  Rhoades  (1976). 
15.  The  Go1 dfel  d-Ouandt  test was  employed.  The  E_.-statistic obtained by 
running equation 1 in  table 1 was  1.24  for 2 subsamples  based on  size. 
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Best available copyAppendix 1  Variable  Definitions 
P :  Average  fourth-quarter bid price of  a share of  MBHC  stock,  -1 
divided  by  book  value of equity per share, averaged over 1978 
and  1979. 
P  Average of  Pi and  bid  price of  MBHC  stock June  30,  -2 '  - 
1980,  divided by  book  val ue  of  equity  per share, year-end 1979. 
P  .  Numerator  identical  to El.  Denominator  is the book  value  -3  ' 
of  equity per share pl us  the per-share difference between  the 
market  and  book  value of  total  investment  securities. 
:  Average of  1978 and  1979  returns on  equity,  each  formed  by 
dividing year-end  net income  after taxes before securities trans- 
actions by  average  equity. 
SIZE:  MBHC  consol idated  total  deposits ,  year-end 1978. 
CTPSIZE:  SIZE times  the structural  index  CTP. 
LEVC:  MBHC  consol i dated  short-term pl us  1  ong-term  debt  di  vi ded  by 
average  equity,' averaged over 1978  and  1979. 
LABORCR:  Total  labor-re1  ated expenses,  divided by  total operating 
income,  averaged  over 1978  and  1979. 
TESR:  Book  va1 ue  of  tax-exempt  securities divided by  average 
total  assets, averaged  over 1978 and  1979. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyLDRAT:  Consol i  dated net 1  oans  di  vi  ded by  total deposits,  averaged 
over 1978 and 1979. 
STDR:  Consol i  dated short-term debt  divided by  total deposits, 
averaged over 1978  and 1979. 
CVROE:  Coefficient of variation of  the return on  equity,  measured 
over the years 1974  to  1977. 
GRTD:  Percent change  in  MBHC  total deposits,  1977-78. 
CR5:  Share  of  statewide  deposits controlled by  the five largest 
banking organizations. 
BRDUM1:  Equal  to one if  state permits  1  imited branching;  equal  to 
zero otherwise. 
BRDUM2:  Equal  to one if  statewide branching is  permitted;  equal 
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Best available copy[able  1  5 truc  t.ure-Performance  Equations  (cont. ) 
P  2 dependent 
Variable  CTP  SlZE18  LEVC  LABORCR  GRTD  CR5  BRDUMl  BRDUM2  Constant  F  R~ 
coefficient  0.0071  -2.0~10  -0.1134  -3.391  1.283  0.4066  -0.145  -0.184  1.13  11.06***  0.58 
t-statistic  3.04***  1.32*  5.49***  5.48***  .  3.89***  1.89***  2.80***  2.87*** 
CTPK 
Coefficient  0.0415  -2.0x10-~  -0.1109  -3.400  1 .2650  0.4031  -0.134  -0.167  1.17  10.28***  0.51 
t-statistic  2.54***  1.32*  5.26***  4.45***  3.75***  1. Re**  2.55***  2.59*** 
FCTP 
Coefficient  0.0608  -2.nx10-~  -0.1132  -3.335  1.2552  0.3926  -0.140  -0.178  1.45  11.04***  0.58 
t-statistic  3.0  ***  1.38*  5.49***  4.51 ***  3.81 ***  1 .82***  2.73***  2.81 
Pj dependent 
Variahle  CTP 
coefficient  0.0096  -2.3~10-  -0.1321  -3.3503  1.6438  0.1485  -0.169  -0.215  1  .31  16.65  0.69 
t-stCtti5tic  4.24  1.62  6.42  4.52  5.08  0.67  3.31  3.40 
CTPE 
Corf  f icient  0.0641  -2.5x10-~  -0.1 304  -3.3688  1.6208  0.1419  -0.160  -0.201  1.33  16.16  0.68 
t-statistic  4.06  1.70  6.29  4.50  4.96  0.63  3.13  3.19 
FCTP 
Crwfficient  0.0047  -2.4xl0-'  -0.1321  -3.2614  1.6035  0.1252  -0.165  -0.209  1.75  16.84  0.69 
t-qtotistic  4.30  1 .70  6.45  4.43  4.98  0.57  3.26  3.34 
Variable  CTP  TESll  LORAT  STOR  GRTD  CVROE  LABORCR  CR5  BROUMl  DROUMZ  Constant  F  ltL 
coefficient  0.00061  0.2204  0.0658  -0.1201  0.1269  0.0046  -0.2562  0.0559  -0.016  -0.023  0.08  4.31*A*  0.37 
t-statirtic  l.R5**  2.55***  1.01**  2.61***  2.59***  1 .98**  2.4 7***  1.85**  2.06**  2.20** 
CTPE 
Coefficient  0.0031  0.2235  0.0668  -0.1161  0.1248  0.0046  -0.2555  0.0555  -0.015  -0.021  0.00  1.  I?***  0.35 
t-statistic  1.4R*  2.56**'  1.02**  2.52***  2.52***  1.98**  2.43***  1 .el**  1.92**  2.03** 
FClP 
Coefficient  0.0251  0.2166  0.0655  -0.121 2  0.1248  0.0044  -0.2495  0.0543  -0.015  -0.023  0.10  4.304**  0.36 
t-statistic  1.79**  2.50***  1.79**  2.64***  2.55***  1.92**  2.39**  1.79**  2.01**  2.14** 
l  Signififantat tI~elOpercerttlevel,orte-tdil  test 
*'  5iqnifir.ant at  111~  5  percprtt  level,  orte-tail  test. 
*'*  \ic~t~ifiiar~t  at Il~c  1  lrerc'c*~~t  level,  one-tail  test. 
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